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14. ABSTRACT Military doctrine serves to standardize terminology, training, and processes in order to enhance operational effectiveness. Subsequently, the principles of war found within doctrine serve as fundamental guidelines for consideration in the planning and conduct of operations. Absent from the U.S. Principles of War, despite its ability to enhance operational effectiveness and improve the chances for success, is the Maintenance of Morale. In the context of warfare, morale may be considered the sum of all inputs that contribute to a positive state of mind and instills within an armed force the will to fight despite the presence of adversity. Morale, or the lack thereof, can determine whether an armed force will lose, be able to maintain its ability to continue to fight past the logical culminating point, or achieve victory in battle. There are many historical examples to back this premise. This paper argues that the principles of war in U.S. military doctrine should include morale as a distinct principle because morale is of commensurate importance to the other principles currently recognized. In support of this argument, discussion and analysis of what morale offers as a principle of war includes what morale as a principle of war is; morale's benefits to operations; the implementation and measurement of morale; and the feasibility of incorporating morale into U.S. doctrine.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Considerations for Morale as a U.S. Principle of War

by

Barry R. Parker

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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03 May 2010

Abstract

Military doctrine serves to standardize terminology, training, and processes in order to enhance operational effectiveness. Subsequently, the principles of war found within doctrine serve as fundamental guidelines for consideration in the planning and conduct of operations. Absent from the U.S. Principles of War, despite its ability to enhance operational effectiveness and improve the chances for success, is the Maintenance of Morale.

In the context of warfare, morale may be considered the sum of all inputs that contribute to a positive state of mind and instills within an armed force the will to fight despite the presence of adversity. Morale, or the lack thereof, can determine whether an armed force will lose, be able to maintain its ability to continue to fight past the logical culminating point, or achieve victory in battle. There are many historical examples to back this premise.

This paper argues that the principles of war in U.S. military doctrine should include morale as a distinct principle because morale is of commensurate importance to the other principles currently recognized. In support of this argument, discussion and analysis of what morale offers as a principle of war includes what morale as a principle of war is; morale's benefits to operations; the implementation and measurement of morale; and the feasibility of incorporating morale into U.S. doctrine.

INTRODUCTION

Some might question the importance of morale in fighting and winning wars. Those same people might argue that massing more forces and having better equipment, ultimately, is what ensures victory against any enemy large or small. British forces who participated in the Falklands War, however, might disagree with that presumption. In an article titled “The Falklands X-Factor,” Brian James summarizes their plight as follows:

The recapture of the Falkland Islands from an Argentine invading force in 1982 was against all military logic: army doctrine declares that the attacking force should outnumber the occupying force by three to one, whereas the 6,000-strong British force was half the size of its dug-in opponents; it was also 8,000 miles from re-supply and reinforcements, with the dot of Ascension Island, 3,200 miles away in the mid-Atlantic, its nearest friendly land. For twenty-five years historians have sought an explanation for this 'impossible' victory. Most have settled for a one-word answer - 'morale'.¹

Much of the available research and analysis conducted on military effectiveness focuses on, among other things, tangible elements like the size of assigned forces and the development and employment of new technologies and weapons systems while on the other hand, intangible elements are sometimes overlooked. This may be explained because intangible elements of warfare are difficult to define and hard to implement and measure. One such intangible element of warfare worthy of further consideration is morale, which is the focus of this paper. Despite the inclusion of morale as a principle of war in other countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, and China, the U.S. does not recognize it as a principle of war.² Should U.S. military doctrine address morale as a principle of war? This paper concludes that the principles of war in U.S. military doctrine should include morale as a

1. Brian James, “The Falklands X-Factor,” *History Today* 57, no. 5 (01 May 2007): 32, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 05 March 2010).

2. Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, Joint Forces Staff College Publication (JFSC PUB) 1(Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, 2000), D-2, http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/3000-3999/CIM_3020_15D.pdf/ (accessed 03 March 2010).

distinct principle because morale is of commensurate importance to the other principles currently recognized. In support of the central argument, discussion and analysis of what morale offers as a principle of war will include the following: what morale as a principle of war is; morale's benefits to operations; the implementation and measurement of morale; and the feasibility of incorporating into U.S. doctrine.

BACKGROUND

Before going into the discussion of adding morale as a principle of war to U.S. doctrine, it is appropriate to discuss the purpose of doctrine and the applicability of the principles of war to doctrine. According to CJCS JP1, the purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces through standardization in various areas including terminology, training, and processes.³ Thus, enhancing operational effectiveness improves the chances of achieving stated strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Currently, under the header of Principles of Joint Operations, joint U.S. doctrine recognizes nine principles of war plus three other principles that may apply to joint operations. The nine (core) principles of war historically recognized in the U.S. are mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, and simplicity. The three additional principles that may apply to joint operations are restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Combined, these principles are the 12 Principles of Joint Operations.⁴ To be fair, there has been some debate as to the validity of principles of war in doctrine. However, the United States along with many other countries with sizeable militaries have incorporated them. Even proponents against the principles of war as doctrine have recognized there is

3. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication (JP) 1 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 May 2007), A-1.

4. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1), II-1 – II-2.

value in their use. In a Proceedings article titled “Take the Principles with a PINCH OF SALT,” Ian Roxborough cautions against taking the principles of war too literally and applying them in an overly rigid fashion. Still, he does acknowledge, “as a mental checklist, the idea of principles of war has some merit as a form of doctrine, because they state a general consensus concerning the main things to be considered when engaging in war. As a pragmatic rule of thumb, or list of things to consider, principles of war are a useful way of making sure that we organize our thinking rigorously.”⁵ These principles are not detailed standard procedures or mandates that require rigid adherence, as each conflict and associated objectives vary depending on the situation. Rather, they are fundamental guidelines to consider during the planning and conduct of operations. The principles from which operational plans are laid should take into consideration a number of factors including the center of gravity, strengths, and weaknesses of not only the enemy, but friendly forces as well. Not every principle will be applicable in every situation—critical analysis and shrewd judgment on the part of the operational commander and his staff are vital.

DEFINITION

Absent from the U.S. principles of war is morale. Morale is a word that conjures up many different meanings depending on the context in which it is applied. Merriam-Webster defines morale as “the mental and emotional condition (as of enthusiasm, confidence, or loyalty) of an individual or group with regard to the function or tasks at hand.”⁶ At the national-strategic level of war, the high morale of a nation’s public is of utmost importance because without it, continued support of blood and treasure is not sustainable. In his book

5. Ian Roxborough, “Take the Principles with a PINCH OF SALT,” *Proceedings*, 01 October 2005, 52-55, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

6. *Merriam-Webster Online*, s.v. “morale,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morale/> (accessed 05 March 2010).

Grand Strategy, John Collins referred to his rendition of the principle of morale as one that recognized that war involved a test of wills not only between the armed forces, but also of entire peoples and when the desire to compete is extinguished all is lost.⁷ At the operational and tactical levels of war, morale addresses the will of an armed force to fight. James Ulio, a Brigadier General in the U.S. Army during WWII wrote, "Military morale is that conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and in the unit of command, which holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or influence."⁸ Many years and conflicts have passed since the time of that writing, yet the basic premise still holds true. Morale can be the determining factor in achieving victory or defeat. An armed force with a tenacious fighting spirit may be able to overcome seemingly insurmountable odds and emerge victorious against a formidable adversary. The United Kingdom, one of our strongest allies, has long recognized the importance of morale. Prominent strategist Basil Liddell Hart observed that what often decides the issues of war is a loss of hope rather than loss of life. It is along that line of thought, post-WWII, that the Maintenance of Morale was added to the British principles of war.⁹ British Defence Doctrine provides a comprehensive definition for morale, which describes the Maintenance of Morale as follows:

Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion. No doctrine, plan or formula for conducting warfare is likely to succeed without the maintenance of morale, which, except in the extreme circumstances, depends upon affording personnel the best chances of success or survival. High morale is characterized by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. It is especially manifested as staying power and resolve, the will to win and prevail in spite of provocation and

7. John M. Collins, "Rethinking the Principles of War," *Proceedings*, 01 November 2003, 24, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 25 February 2010).

8. James A. Ulio, "Military Morale," *The American Journal of Sociology* 47, no.3 (November 1941): 321, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

9. John G. Morgan and Anthony D. McIvor, "Rethinking the principles of war," *Proceedings*, 01 October 2003, 34-38, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

adversity. It is sustained and progressively increased by success on operations and is most powerful when it suffuses the whole chain of command.¹⁰

BENEFITS TO OPERATIONS

Having presented the concept of morale as a principle of war, the next logical question to ask is why is it important? The simple answer is because morale, or the lack thereof, can be the determining factor in whether an armed force loses, continues to maintain its ability to fight (sometimes against all odds and beyond the logical culmination point), or achieves victory in a battle, operation, or campaign. Morale is an individual attribute that can garner collective gains. In a situation where all things are equal between two opposing forces, morale may make the necessary difference in seizing the advantage. Therefore, morale must be fostered and present at all levels of war. Additionally, once present, the protection and sustainment of morale must remain a priority. In the case of an adversary, morale is a potential critical vulnerability that may be susceptible to attack.

In a Military Affairs article in 1942, author Thomas Camfield bolsters his argument on the importance of the will to fight by detailing arguments made by Colonel Munson, Training Director of the Medical Corps, when advocating for a systematic troop morale program during World War I. “It was the determination to ‘win or die,’ he suggested, that enabled a ‘unified handful of Greeks’ to defeat the Persian hordes at Marathon. But, ‘we need look no further than Russia and the Bolsheveki... to see a nation of limitless man power, abundance of material and adequate resources, in the dust of defeat for lack of an unified will to use these factors to fight.’”¹¹ George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during

10. Chiefs of Staff, *British Defence Doctrine*, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01 (Swindon, Wiltshire: DCDC, August 2008), 2-3, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CE5E85F2-DEEB-4694-B8DE-4148A4AEDF91/0/20100114jdp0_01_bddUDCDCIMAPPS.pdf (accessed 19 March 2010).

11. Thomas M. Camfield, "Will to Win -- The U.S. Army Troop Morale Program of World War I," *Military Affairs* 41, no. 3 (October 1977): 126, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

WWII, and later a diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize winner¹², was a firm believer that morale was essential to successful military operations.¹³ He stated “With it, all things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught”.¹⁴ On another occasion, he said he would “change Napoleon’s axiom of the ratio of morale to material from three to one to six to one.”¹⁵

The importance of morale is evident not only in the beliefs of individuals, but also in history itself, which provides many examples where morale has played an important role in the conduct of war. In *Democracies at War*, Dan Reiter and Allen Stam used POLITY data (global political regime characteristics from 1800 to present-day)¹⁶ and the U.S. Army’s Historical Evaluation and Research Organization data to test the impact of various factors including morale on the outcome of battles to determine if greater levels correlated to higher likelihoods of success. Their research showed that morale was indeed a key determinant of victory.¹⁷ Such findings are easy to conceptualize upon closer examination of battles and wars where morale made a difference.

An important lesson of morale making a difference exists in the role that a lack of morale, or degraded morale, has to military operations. One needs to look no further than the case of the Vietnam War to illustrate how the impact of morale within the general populace can influence the outcome of war. In 1965, well prior to the conclusion of that conflict,

12. Frederick W. Haberman, ed., *Nobel Lectures, Peace 1951-1970*, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1972, quoted in Nobel Foundation, “George C. Marshall – Biography,” http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-bio.html (accessed 19 March 2010).

13. Russell W. Glenn, “No more principles of war,” *Parameters* 28, no. 1 (01 April 1998): 62, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

14. *Ibid.*, 62.

15. Ulio, “Military Morale,” 330

16. Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University, “Polity IV Project: Home Page,” <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed 23 April 2010).

17. Risa A. Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay,” *International Security* 28, no. 2 (Autumn, 2003): 158, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

author Herbert Wolff wrote of the requirement to have the public's support in order to win in Vietnam; that public support was so critical, it should be listed as a tenth principle of war.¹⁸ His assertion proved to be true. Despite the Americans' ability to win battle after battle, one could argue the war was lost due to a lack of public support, emanating from low public morale on the issue of war in Vietnam. The public demanded withdrawal, and the U.S. administration acquiesced. Similarly, Desert Storm showed that low morale on the battlefield could result in defeat; many Iraqi forces, suffering from a lack of will, surrendered to any opposing force they could find, even television crews.¹⁹ A common assertion is that the extended air campaign significantly degraded Iraqi morale, which in turn resulted in their lack of a will to fight.

Another aspect of the importance of morale and subsequent benefits to operations lies in the ability to continue fighting past the logical point of culmination. The German Army's performance in both World Wars is compelling because despite losing in both efforts, they fought until the very end. Their performance from 1944-1945 during World War II is particularly astounding as the likely outcome of defeat was evident at least 12 months prior to the conclusion of the war.²⁰ The fact that the Germans lost should not discount the important role of morale in operations. A number of different factors must culminate before victory may be attained, and morale is but one. Looking at World War II in retrospect, during that extra year of fighting made possible by high morale and a will to fight despite adverse conditions, German leadership could have reassessed their approach to the war. Instead of charging forward in futility, they could have re-examined their objectives and

18. Glenn, "No More Principles," 62

19. Morgan and McIvor, "Rethinking the Principles," 34-38

20. Hew Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 2 (April 2006): 211, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

modified their operational design to create the necessary conditions for success. The potential for morale to extend the conduct of operations, allow changes to operational design, and alter seemingly predetermined outcomes is a valuable lesson learned, and the application of which should remain in every nation's tool kit.

Finally, for many, the primary reason to foster morale is to capitalize on the ability for an armed force to achieve victory despite having the odds stacked against their favor. High morale contributes to confidence, group cohesion, and ultimately a will to fight regardless of how disparate the conditions of battle are. The colonists who challenged the Great British Empire or Admiral Halsey's forces at the Battle of Guadalcanal are but a couple of the many instances of the observed truism that victory often goes to the side with the strongest will.²¹ A third example would be the performance of the British against the Argentines during the Falkland's War as alluded to in the introduction. In each of these cases, the winning side was able to overcome adversity and prevail despite a disadvantage in numbers, equipment, lines of communication, or some other aspect of operations.

IMPLEMENTATION

Morale cannot be surged. In order for it to be present in battle, morale must be instilled and sustained within an armed force throughout all levels of the chain-of-command and all phases of the deployment cycle, regardless of the branch of service. For simplicity in discussion the phases may be broken into a pre-deployment phase (man, train, and equip), deployed operations phase (where benefits of high morale are reaped during battles, operations, and campaigns), and post-deployment phase (sustainment and recovery). In order for morale to permeate through all levels of the force and phases of the deployment cycle, strong leadership in concert with a centralized, systematic approach toward its maintenance

21. Morgan and McIvor, "Rethinking the Principles," 34-38

is required. Additionally, due consideration should also be given to undermining the morale of the adversary as part of the operational design of an operation. Currently in the U.S., an ad hoc approach to morale is applied. While aspects of morale are touched upon in various aspects of the deployment cycle (often in good fashion), the ad hoc approach has led to some inconsistency in application, thereby resulting in instances of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Morale is an intangible, and resides within the mind. To wit, establishing morale within an armed force requires many different inputs. In 1942, Brigadier General Ulio, U.S. Army, wrote the following on the making of morale:

Whether the soldier has physical comforts or suffers physical hardships may be a factor but is seldom the determining factor in making or unmaking his morale. A cause known and believed in; knowledge that substantial justice governs discipline; the individual's confidence and pride in himself, his comrades, his leaders; the unit's pride in its own will; these basic things, supplemented by intelligent welfare and recreation measures and brought to life by a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, combine to weld a seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation.²²

No single input or variable is likely to result in high morale. Moreover, the absence of a single input or variable could be the missing link required for an individual to achieve high morale. Therefore, it is imperative to pursue multiple avenues to inspire morale and thereby ensure the maximum number of service members reach and maintain a high level of morale.

The pre-deployment phase is crucial to building the morale requisite in combat operations. That process starts with recruitment. General Ulio applied the following analogy: "The selection of men themselves is like mining the ore and taking the metal from its matrix... Inferior steel is rejected at the beginning, lest there develop flaws that may at

22. Ulio, "Military Morale," 321

some critical time of strain cause a break in the blade.”²³ Recruitment is an area where the U.S. Armed Services have generally done well in recent history. High entrance standards with regard to physical and mental health are in place and the result is a pool of talented, malleable young men and women from which the services have to pull from and shape for future operations. This trend must continue even when recruitment is challenging, most notably during periods of healthy economic growth or when the nation is engaged in war. Case in point, in 2008, 25% of Army recruits lacked their GED. This is the highest level since the 1970s. High school dropouts that later earn their GED tend to drop out of the Army at higher rates, and specifically during initial training and first terms of service.²⁴ Such trends are counter to nurturing trust and confidence in fellow service members. It can be a detriment to morale and military leadership must resist the temptation to relax entrance standards.

Another aspect of building morale is training. Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, a prolific military historian, noted in 1973: “The soldier is taught and encouraged to take cover, a situation in which he may discard his leader and, if skillful, avoid taking part in the battle at all. It is easy to escape from the danger zone; between danger and safety, the combat soldier has virtually a free choice. The problem of morale today lies in training the soldier to select the more dangerous of two courses.”²⁵ The aforementioned sentiment held validity in 1973 and is easily applicable to the range of conflicts that have occurred throughout the world’s history to the present day. If morale is a confluence of many inputs that results in the will to win, and all that entails, despite adversity, then training is a primary means to that end.

23. Ibid., 326

24. Sydney J. Freedburg Jr., “The Army’s Growing Pains,” *National Journal*, September 2009, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 18 April 2010).

25. Strachan, “Training, Morale and War,” 217

For training to translate to success in battle, it must be realistic and continuous. Field Marshall William Slim recognized the close relationship of training and morale and the impacts on battle. When he took over the devastated 14th Army in Burma during World War II, he established two training divisions. The training divisions, led by battle tested instructors, passed along their practical jungle work experience to recruits who had already completed their initial training. Realized benefits of higher quality reinforcements in terms of skill and morale were noticeable within a period of several months.²⁶

Training and equipping is an area in which the U.S. armed forces have made great investments in time and money. Training occurs throughout the entire deployment cycle, with every attempt made to make training as realistic as possible. Training encompasses not only how to use the assigned weapons and associated systems on an individual level, but how to operate as a unit and with other units during operations via various field and fleet maneuvers/exercises at home and abroad. The training continuum addresses service specific requirements, joint and multi-national operations, as well as civil-military coordination in preparation for the full range of military operations. As such, the U.S. military as a whole is widely recognized as the best-trained fighting force in the world. An area worth monitoring, however, is the tendency to replace training in the field and at sea with simulation-based training in an attempt to achieve cost savings. In the near term, mixed results underscore the impact of simulation on training effectiveness, morale building, and its subsequent impact to real-world operations. The long-term impacts are yet to be determined.

The maintenance of morale during deployed operations is of utmost importance because it is in this phase that high morale during the conduct of operations contributes to the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The maintenance of morale

26. Strachan, "Training, Morale, and War," 224

starts with leadership at the highest levels. While military leaders cannot directly influence the public, they are in a position to impress upon political leaders the importance of maintaining the public's support during operations.²⁷ Current examples of this are Iraq and Afghanistan, whereby U.S. armed forces have received unprecedented support despite a divided populace on whether or not the use of armed force is a proper course of action. The opposite of this occurred during the Vietnam War where the lack of public support was a blow to troop morale. Other important aspects of maintenance in this phase includes solid leadership of assigned forces, continued training to stay current on observed conditions of current operations, and continued provision of equipment and supplies necessary for continued operations. Perhaps the most important aspect of morale during operations, and the most deficient in U.S. military operations, is its application in the operational art of warfare. Currently, morale is not a recognized principle of war in the U.S. Although not an absolute, the absence of morale as a principle may lead to missed opportunities in attacking an adversary's ability to maintain their morale as part of the operational design of an operation or campaign.

The maintenance of morale during the post-deployment phase is equally important as the pre-deployment and deployment phases. The employment of programs and mechanisms to build and sustain morale in those phases should continue post-deployment. However, the rigors of sustained operations, separation from families and friends, and observed injury and loss of life to comrades can place a lot of strain on a service member's mental health. Depression, suicide, and post-traumatic stress disorder are a real and present threat to mental health. They facilitate a negative state mind and are contrary to good morale. The way that the chain-of-command deals with the unique aspects of psychological health and morale in

27. Glenn, "No More Principles," 62

the post-deployment phase can make all the difference. If service members know that their leadership is concerned about their physical and mental well-being, morale will improve.

Finally, rest and relaxation is a pre-requisite for the maintenance of morale at all levels of the chain of command and throughout all phases of the deployment cycle. General Ulio recognized this during the second world war when he stated “the human machine needs a good deal of reconditioning, needs it in daily, weekly rhythm—food, sleep, rest, recreation, relaxation, just plain fun.”²⁸ The creation of the Morale Branch under the Office of the Chief of Staff in 1941 reinforced such sentiments. Funds were available to provide a variety of services including athletic facilities and equipment, facilities to show motion pictures, support for mobile units to provide professional volunteer entertainment, service clubs, libraries, cafeterias, and temporary lodging for visitors.²⁹ Present day, these types of programs and services, provided through the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department remain a staple of military life within the continental United States and overseas.

MEASUREMENT

Measuring military morale is a difficult thing to accomplish. An intangible element residing within the mind, it presents many challenges to monitoring. One way to grasp the situation is to make use of anonymous surveys. Another solution might be to monitor various statistics including rates of retention, desertion, Uniform Code of Justice infractions, suicides, and instances of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All of these could be lagging indicators of poor mental health and/or morale within the ranks. Additionally, all of the aforementioned methods to monitor do currently exist. The problem being, various organizations within the Department of Defense and U.S. Government own different pieces

28. Ulio, “Military Morale,” 329

29. P. S. Madigan, “Military Neuro Psychiatry, Discipline and Morale,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 32, no. 5 (January – February 1942): 496-497, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

of these monitoring systems and those different organizations may or may not have influence on the treatment of service members throughout all phases of the deployment cycle. What is required is unity of effort to achieve maximum results. Furthermore, beyond statistics, the identification of individuals suffering from depression, suicidal tendencies, and PTSD is problematic because a number of individuals are afraid to admit they have a problem. In these types of situations, education and proactive leadership at all levels of command is required. Leaders, officers and enlisted alike, must interact (converse) with their peers and subordinates with a critical eye toward the identification of symptoms. Psychological illness occurs in significant numbers and its occurrence contributes to lower levels of morale. In 2007, the Rand Corporation conducted a study titled “Invisible Wounds of War”. In the study, they estimated 300,000 service members suffered from depression or PTSD.³⁰ A serious issue, leadership must ensure identification, tracking, and treatment of psychological illness remains on the forefront in order to ensure the restoration of normal psychological health and improved morale amongst service members.

INCORPORATION INTO U.S. DOCTRINE

While U.S. armed forces have not adopted the maintenance of morale as a principle of war, it has long been accepted as a relevant aspect to the effectiveness of a fighting force. During World War I, Colonel Munson of the U.S. Army Medical Corps was a key proponent of establishing a systematic troop morale program, which did indeed happen toward the end of World War I.³¹ He successfully argued that America was overly materialistic in terms of what made an effective soldier. Emphasis on men, munitions and money overshadowed the psychological aspects of what makes a soldier fight. Psychological stimulus, driven by

30. Freedburg, “Army’s Growing Pains”

31. Camfield, “Will to Win,” 125

morale, was what brought effect to the material attributes of men, their equipment, and their training.³² Since the establishment of that first troop morale program, morale has remained an important consideration for the employment of U.S. armed forces. Because it is not centered in doctrine, the maintenance of morale has been applied in a sporadic manner across the services.

Doctrine is a mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of military operations through the standardization of terminology, training, and processes. Accordingly, principles of war in doctrine serve as fundamental guidelines for the planning and conduct of operations and campaigns. Hence, any aspect of warfare that considerably affects the outcome of war should be contained within doctrine. Morale is one such aspect of warfare that is a key determinant of victory, as evidenced throughout history. It is a powerful force multiplier and its recognition as such is likely the reasoning behind why other countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, and China have incorporated it into their doctrine as a principle of war. Despite various reviews of the principles of war in U.S. doctrine, morale has not yet made the cut. Perhaps it is time to reconsider.

Lastly, any further consideration for the inclusion of morale as a U.S. principle of war in U.S. doctrine should include attack on an enemy's morale as a prime element of the principle. The significance of the maintenance of morale is as important to the opposition in their pursuit of goals and objectives as it is to friendly forces.

COUNTER-ARGUMENT

In a voluntary military, the system currently in place in the U.S., service members already possess a will to fight. Morale programs are only necessary for conscription forces compelled to serve in the military. The need to add morale as a principle of war does not

32. Ibid., 126

make sense because factors that contribute to high morale are already accounted for via various organizations throughout the services. The U.S. recruits the best qualified candidates, makes significant investments in training and equipment, and ensures only top quality officers and senior enlisted leaders are afforded the opportunity to lead the nation's young men and women into battle. Additionally, every effort is made to ensure the positive psychological health of service members as evidenced by the fact there is a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department onboard every U.S. military installation throughout the world. Their primary mission is to ensure high morale is maintained for all service members and their dependents.

Furthermore, despite the fact that other countries have adopted morale as a principle of war, there is no compelling reason for the U.S. armed forces, the preeminent global military force, to do so. While not listed as a separate principle of war, morale is already an important, albeit secondary, aspect of U.S. military culture and is inherent in their operations. In addition, the idea that attacking an enemy's morale can influence the outcome of war is not relevant in the types of wars that are presently being fought. In a *Military Review* article, Alan Zimm notes "Terrorists often use their own deaths to inflict losses on their enemies; often operate alone or in small groups; are impervious to or unaware of setbacks to other groups or their causes (indeed, setbacks sometimes fuel their fanaticism); and are generally impervious to moral persuasion."³³

CONCLUSIONS

Military doctrine serves as a mechanism to standardize terminology, training, and processes in order to enhance operational effectiveness. Nested within doctrine are the

33. Alan D. Zimm, "A Causal Model of Warfare," *Military Review*, 01 January 2001, 52, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 20 March 2010).

principles of war and they serve as fundamental guidelines for consideration in the planning and conduct of operations. A basic premise of any principle of war is that it may have a considerable impact on the outcome of a battle, operation or campaign. Through proper employment, operational effectiveness may be improved and success achieved.

The word morale can mean different things to different people. In the context of warfare, specifically as a principle of war, the definition can be long and complex. In short, the maintenance of morale is the sum of all things that contributes to a positive state of mind and instills a will to fight despite adversity. Morale, or the lack thereof, can be the determining factor in whether an armed force loses, continues to fight, or achieves victory in battle. The benefits of morale are significant and historic examples demonstrating its significance are plentiful.

Morale cannot be surged. To ensure morale is present when needed the most, during combat operations, the maintenance of morale must occur in all phases of the deployment cycle. Furthermore, the maintenance of morale must permeate all levels of the chain-of-command and extend to the civilian populace as well. The ingredients for success will include a potent mix of good recruitment, training, equipment, and leadership. In addition, the aggressive monitoring of psychological health and morale must be persistent throughout.

Finally, the data and analysis suggests that high morale does enhance operational effectiveness and is a key determinant of victory. The inclusion of morale as a principle of war in the military doctrine of other nations including the United Kingdom, Australia, and China further validates the impact of morale in war. Still, morale remains excluded from U.S. military doctrine. There is no doctrinal guidance on either the maintenance of friendly morale or the attack of an adversary's morale as part of operational art and design.

RECOMMENDATION

The principles of war in U.S. military doctrine should be modified to include morale as a distinct principle because morale is of commensurate importance to the other principles currently recognized.

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